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Louis Arnaud Reid was a British philosopher who held the foundation Chair in Philosophy of Education at the London University Institute of Education.〔Richard Aldrich, ''The Institute of Education 1902–2002: A Centenary History''.〕 He was a founding contributor to the ''British Journal of Aesthetics'', and is best known for his writings on epistemology and aesthetics. He influenced figures as diverse as Susanne Langer, Lionel Trilling〔Trilling wrote the introduction to the first American edition of ''A Study in Aesthetics'' (Reader's Subscription Inc, 1954).〕 and Harold Osborne.〔There is a Wikipedia entry for Harold Osborne in Spanish.〕 Jacques Barzun said that Reid's ''A Study in Aesthetics'' was the book that most influenced him in his life.〔Barzun, Jacques. ''Berlioz and the Romantic Century. '' Columbia UP (1969.) I.44n.〕 As A.J. Ayer recounts in his autobiography, Reid is also remembered as the candidate preferred by the philosophers on the appointment committee for the chair in philosophy at the University of London. The philosophers were outvoted by the lay members of the committee, who appointed Ayer instead.〔Ayer, A.J.. ''Part of My Life,'' Collins (1984.) 308.〕 Reid was born in the manse at Ellon, north of Aberdeen, the descendant of Presbyterian and later Free Church ministers.〔Biographical details come from Reid's memoir, ''Yesterdays Today''. Canberra: Samizdat Press (CreateSpace), 2013.〕 He later became an Anglican and later still an agnostic. He went to school at the Leys in Cambridge, where he knew Mr Chips, and then briefly flirted with the idea of a career in engineering. He also volunteered as a sapper in the Royal Engineers early in the First World War, though he was invalided out on the basis of rheumatic fever. It was at about this period that he first read Bergson, and found his vocation in philosophy, going on to study at Edinburgh from which he graduated in 1919. His first lectureship was at Aberystwyth, during which time he wrote the (realist) PhD which became his first book, under the supervision of the leading idealist, J.H. Muirhead. From Aberystwith he moved to Liverpool as a senior lecturer in 1926, and then in 1932 to a chair in philosophy at the Armstrong College, Newcastle, a college of Durham University. In 1947 he was invited to move to the Institute in London, where he remained until his retirement in 1962. He continued to write and teach for many years afterwards. ==Theory of perception== In his first book, ''Knowledge and Truth'', Reid argued against the representational theory of perception.〔L.A. Reid, ''Knowledge and Truth'', Macmillan (1923) 105, 113.〕 This is the view implicit in Locke that when we see an object we in fact see an image (a representation) in our mind which is the product of the stimulation of our optic nerves by light. The problem with this account is that it makes the image the immediate object of perception, and thus leaves us with no direct evidence of the physical world. It leaves us vulnerable to Berkeley's idealism (the view that there is no physical world). Reid (anticipating Mary Warnock)〔Mary Warnock, ''Imagination.'' London: Faber, 1976.〕 argued that the representational theory is faulty.〔For an exposition of Reid’s views, see Nicholas Reid, ''Coleridge, Form and Symbol.'' Ashgate (2006) chapter 1.〕 When we see, he argued, we are not ‘seeing’ an image or sense datum in the mind: we are ‘seeing’ the world, albeit not in the direct fashion imagined by the naïve realist. The ‘seeing’ is in fact the act by which the image or datum is constructed in the first place. Imaging can thus be compared to the act by which a blind person constructs an ‘image’ of the external world on the basis of information transmitted through his or her white cane; for though our visual sense is much more sophisticated and appears immediate, it is in fact mediated by light (a physical intermediary like the cane), and involves the same kind of construction. ‘Imaging’ is thus an object-directed, mental act. (This is the basis of Reid’s qualified realism.) It follows that the sense datum is not ''what'' is known but is an active way of ''knowing'' the world. Moreover, the sense datum ''per se'' is an abstraction rather than a substantial entity, though sensing (conceived as an act) is very real. Sense qualities (qualia) are in a radical sense ''secondary qualities''; not representations of the world, but instead ''presentations'', or the way in which we understand the world. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Louis Arnaud Reid」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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